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SUMMARY 
This study has employed principles of behavioral economics, primarily that of 
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA), in an attempt to understand the gambling behavior of 
individuals playing slot machines and to perhaps shape regulation towards excessive 
behaviour or addiction. 
 
Individuals are often myopic in evaluating sequences and gambling opportunities. A 
decision-maker with loss aversion exhibits preference reversal, that is, the 
acceptance of a series of the same gambling game that would otherwise have been 
rejected if asked to bet once. It has been suggested that this reversal is caused by 
myopia. The literature suggests that both the Evaluation Period (EP) and the 
Presentation Mode (PM) matter, and that they are due to myopia. Both a longer EP 
and an aggregated PM increase the attractiveness of a series of bets. In this study, we 
argue that the relationship between a longer EP and an aggregated PM may not be 
generalized as suggested by earlier works, for it depends on specific parameters of 
the bets. We introduce the concept of MLA and specifically analyze the causal 
mechanisms through which EP and PM affect the decision-maker gambling with a 
high probability of trivial losses, for example, slot machines or ‘one-arm bandit’ 
machines. 
 
The theoretical analysis predicts that as more returns are evaluated frequently, the 
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more risk aversion individuals will have, resulting in a lower acceptance rate once 
the overall distribution is displayed. Thus, a longer EP cannot be treated the same as 
an aggregated PM for this type of bet. The theoretical postulations are supported by 
experimental evidence. 
 
All slot machines have odds with a high probability for trivial losses. While the 
losses may be small, they do add up quite a bit. In many private clubs, contributions 
from slot machines form a sizeable source of revenue. The impending 
Casino-cum-Integrated Resorts at Sentosa and Marina Bay will no doubt increase 
accessibility to “small gambling” and we need to study closely this type of gambling 
behavior. The way information is provided and processed can have a strong 
influence on choice.
             
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table I: Experiment Design of Study 1 41 
Table II: Data Summary of Study 1 48 
Table III: Regression Results 50 
Table IV: The 2×3 Design of Study 2 52 
Table V: Acceptance Rate of Gambling Games 54 
Table VI: Summary of Hypotheses 66 
 
 
             
 vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: A Probability Weighting Function 13 
Figure 2: A Hypothetical Value Function 14 
Figure 3: Utility of Gains and Losses 25 
Figure 4: The Lottery Space 150ℜ  Erreur ! Signet non défini. 
Figure 5: Iso-D Lines in the Lottery Space 150ℜ  34 
Figure 6: Iso-D lines in the Lottery Space  150ℜ  for Gambles with High 
Probability for Trivial Loss 35 
Figure 7: )(lDG  for 25.2=k   and 88.0== βα  37 
Figure 8:  150ℜ  with Iso-D lines for gambles with High Probability for Trivial 
Loss for   25.2=k  and 88.0== βα  38 
Figure 9: Comparing Betting Patterns 47 
Figure 10: Rational Choice Mechanism 63 




1.1 Gambling and Attitudes to Risk 
Is the acceptance of a single play of a game of chance the same as the acceptance of 
repeated plays of the same game? We make many such decisions in our daily lives, 
i.e. discrete choice (one-time purchase of a bottle of vodka) versus continuous choice 
(how frequent we consume the vodka). While the occasional glass of vodka is 
negligible, a lifetime of frequent consumption on a daily and weekly basis will lead 
to a negative impact on health. The choice to smoke an occasional cigarette or cigar 
in a pub is different from addiction to nicotine. Not putting the seatbelt on a single 
trip to the supermarket is not as risky as consistently not putting on a seatbelt for 
every trip. The individual who goes to the casino to gamble as an entertainment 
activity and is in control of his actions is on safe ground, but one who needs to 
gamble is the individual we should be concerned about. Betting is gambling no 
matter how big or small the amount bet! The issue seems that many people are 
motivated by risk loving considerations and are willing to sacrifice pecuniary gains 
to the out-of-control level, but is this possible if individuals are making decisions 
under the strain of gambling? 
 
Previous studies have focused on repeated decisions that are identically distributed 
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and draw reference from the frequently quoted example by Samuelson (1963), in 
which a colleague decided to reject a simple bet with a fair chance of winning $200 
or losing $100, but was willing to accept a series of 100 such bets. Samuelson made 
an induction statement to prove an inconsistency theorem, which asserts that 
assuming his colleague was a utility maximiser, he should have refused the 
opportunity of a series of bets if he had refused a single bet. In other words, no 
utility function can demonstrate this inconsistent behaviour. This has led to a series 
of works on repeated gambling followed by normative analyses of risk aversion 
within an Expected Utility framework. Works by Lopes (1981), Tversky and 
Bar-Hille (1983), and Shoemaker and Hershey (1996) suggest a failure of Expected 
Utility Theory to explain the phenomenon. Other studies (Lippman & Mamer, 1988; 
Nielsen, 1985; Ross, 1999) show that the Expected Utility maximiser may end up 
making a choice similar to that of Samuelson’s colleague and that risk attitude alone 
is sufficient to explain this behaviour. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
A second stream of literature, central to this thesis, analyzes the phenomenon from 
an experimental perspective. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) introduced the term, 
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA), to explain preference reversal. Individuals faced with 
multiple plays of a game of chance decline the opportunity to play a single game 
owing to reverse preferences when shown a distribution of the same game. MLA 
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combines two aspects of behavioral theory, that of “loss aversion” and “mental 
accounting”, to explain the phenomenon. Loss aversion (Allais, 1979; Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1992) occurs 
when individuals weigh losses greater than gains. Mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) 
describes the dynamic aggregation rules that individuals follow to code and evaluate 
risky outcomes. The MLA concept was introduced to explain the equity premium 
puzzle1. It has been suggested that the volatile return of a stock investment looks 
considerably unattractive in a myopic evaluation 2 . Therefore, longer-horizon 
investors should tolerate more risks because they can more easily diversify risks over 
time by recouping intermediary losses with future chances of winning (Gollier, 
1996). 
 
Thaler et al. (1997) and Gneezy and Potters (1997) provided explicit tests of the 
interdependence between the evaluation period and risk-taking behavior through 
experimental studies. By manipulating the evaluation period of the subjects’ 
sequencing of mixed gambling, a significant impact on acceptance was observed as 
proposed by MLA. Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003) confirmed MLA in an 
experimental competitive environment. When a shorter evaluation period was 
induced, observed equilibrium prices for the assets were lower. Haigh and List (2005) 
found that professional traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a larger 
                                                        
1 This was a term coined by Mehra and Prescott in 1985, and it is based on the observation that individuals are 
more willing to hold government bonds than stocks with a much higher return. 
2 In the studies of investment decisions, employees are presented with the characteristics of 1-year return 
distributions, and then the simulated distributions of 3-year returns. The 1-year return is deemed as myopic 
evaluation. 
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extent than students. 
 
Benartzi and Thaler (1999) confirmed the relationship between the degree of myopia 
and the presentation mode i.e. if an explicit distribution of repeated plays is given, 
subjects are more willing to accept multiple plays. This finding is typical of 
Kahneman and Lovallo’s (1993) argument that individuals tend to consider problems 
as unique rather than aggregate them into a portfolio, which they call “narrow 
framing” 3 . Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) explicitly tested the influence of 
presentation modes on the attractiveness of multiple plays, and showed that 
individuals tend to segregate multiple prospects, isolating each prospect from a 
larger ensemble. They have suggested that the tendency to segregate prospects 
depends on the representation of the problem. The concern regarding the 
attractiveness of the aggregated presentation mode has since been consistently 
raised. 
 
However, Langer and Weber (2001) looked at a specific type of lottery with a low 
probability for high losses and found that an aggregated presentation mode for this 
type of lottery could decrease the players’ willingness to accept prospects, which 
means that an aggregated evaluation could have either a positive or a negative effect 
on them depending on the specific parameters, and that the above phenomenon is not 
as straightforward as the literature suggests. Langer and Weber (2005) extended 
                                                        
3 The concept of framing is important in mental accounting analysis. In framing, individuals alter their 
perspectives according to the surrounding circumstances that they face (Pompian, 2006). Narrow framing means 
considering gambling activities or investments one at a time rather than aggregating them into a portfolio. 
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MLA to Myopic Prospect Theory to incorporate general cases in any economic 
scenario. Pure loss aversion does not fully capture the empirically observed attitude 
towards risk. With diminishing sensitivity in both domains of gain and loss, myopia 
does not decrease the attractiveness of a lottery sequence in general. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
As indicated above, most studies attempt to explain the impact of myopia. All have 
indicated that the effects of a long evaluation period are similar to that of an 
aggregated presentation mode, which means that either a longer evaluation period or 
an aggregated presentation mode would lead to a riskier choice being made more 
attractive, i.e., a shorter evaluation period and a segregated presentation mode would 
reduce the acceptance of repeated plays. However, do these two factors always affect 
decision-makers in the same way? 
 
The current research aims to advance our understanding of MLA in gambling that 
has a high probability of trivial losses but which, in aggregate, could lead to a sizable 
amount of losses over time. Evaluation periods and presentation modes are two 
significant factors in MLA, and the player’s decision is a result of interplay cased by 
them. However, they may not simultaneously affect the weight the players attach to 
losses, which depends on several “special” parameters. To gain a closer 
understanding of MLA in this type of gambling, we look at different mechanisms of 
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the evaluation period and the presentation mode and assess their impact on 
decisions. 
 
We address gambling with a high probability for trivial losses because of its 
worldwide popularity with large numbers of gamblers, who are increasingly 
spending much time and money on slot machines4. Most of them lose money, and 
although they resolve not to play again, they are usually not able to keep their 
resolution as these machines are easily accessible and inexpensive to play. Gambling 
games become more attractive when presented in a segregated mode. In some 
amusement arcades, it is required by law that gambling machines should be turned 
off automatically after an hour of continuous gambling (Traub, 1999) and 
exchanging credits or monies with machines or in any form strictly prohibited 
(Blaszczynski, Sharpe, & Walker, 2003; Turner & Horbay, 2004). One reasonable 
explanation for such mandatory measures is that people in the midst of playing slot 
machines often suspend judgment and produce infrequent assessment of financial 
losses. Consequently, we observe that given a longer evaluation period, individuals 
may put more money into gambling machines. In this example, a long evaluation 
period and an aggregated presentation mode influence the decision-maker in 
opposite directions. The former makes people more risk-loving in playing slot 
machines, but the latter increase aversion to such gambling games. 
 
                                                        
4 Slot machines generally have three or more reels displaying symbols such as lemons, cherries, lucky sevens 
and diamonds (Dickerson, 1996; Turner & Horbay, 2004). 
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To proceed towards a more complete understanding of the conditions under which 
aggregated presentation modes and frequent evaluation periods decrease a gambler’s 
willingness to accept multiple prospects of gambling with a high probability for 
trivial losses, it is vital to gain a deeper perception into the nature of the underlying 
causal mechanisms. The key research question addressed in this thesis is: What are 
the causal mechanisms through which the evaluation period and the presentation 
mode affect decision-makers’ weight they attach to losses when they play gambling 
games with a high probability for trivial losses? We investigate this question by 
employing and adapting two experimental methods introduced by Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) and Gneezy and Potters (1997). The answer to this question has 
significant implications for understanding gambling behavior. 
 
1.4 Overview 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief 
background of MLA, followed by a theoretical analysis to address the specific type 
of gambling, and defines different mechanisms through which the evaluation period 
and the presentation mode work. Chapter 3 presents research hypotheses and reports 
the results of experimental studies. Chapter 4 presents the practical relevance of this 
study and concludes with a short discussion on the usefulness of the study.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Impact of Myopia 
2.1 Myopic Loss Aversion 
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) is an aspect of behavioral theory that combines loss 
aversion and mental accounting. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) use this term to describe 
the preference reversal of a decision-maker contemplating a single game of chance 
versus repeated plays of that game. When evaluating multiple plays of a simple 
game of chance, say a fair chance to win x  or lose y 5 , individuals show 
sensitivity to the amount y  that can be lost with a one-time play. If the distribution 
of returns for the portfolio is held constant, gamblers are more likely to increase the 
acceptance of repeated plays; that is, intuitively, they display MLA, excessively 
concerned about short-term losses. 
 
The interplay between a single play and repeated plays of gambling games has 
fascinated individuals since Samuelson’s observation (1963). A colleague was 
offered a chance to win $200 if the flip of a coin yielded heads and a loss of $100 if 
the coin did not yield heads. The colleague declined this single game of chance, but 
at the same time expressed a willingness to accept a series of 100 such games. 
Samuelson termed the fallacy of large numbers to describe this inconsistent choice, 
                                                        
5 x  and y  respectively denote the amount of money to win and to lose. 
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which asserts that if this colleague would reject a single play at the level of wealth 
obtained from playing 99 times already, he should not then accept multiple plays of 
the same game. Applying backward induction, the colleague should reject playing 
the first game of the multiple plays from the very beginning. Samuelson concluded 
that his colleague’s behavior was irrational within the Expected Utility framework. 
 
Nielsen (1985) , Lippman & Mamer (1988), Ross (1999) and Aloysius (1999) have 
shown that risk aversion alone can adequately explain the phenomenon of refusing a 
single bet while accepting a series of independent bets6. Experimental methods offer 
a different perspective 7 . Experimental models build upon the complexity of 
individuals’ decisions which maximizing expected utility cannot explain8. While 
many studies (Edwards, 1954; Markowitz, 1952) emphasize the fact that individuals 
tend to perceive and evaluate change of wealth rather than final wealth, this has been 
made clearer with the introduction of Prospect Theory9 (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Employing the central concepts of Prospect Theory and extensions, Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995) have proposed a new concept, MLA, to explain the behavior of 
Samuelson’s colleague. 
 
Benartzi and Thaler consider a decision-maker with a value function of the form: 
                                                        
6 For a detailed survey, see Ross (1999). 
7 Theories of choice under uncertainty are broadly categorized as normative and descriptive. Normative theories 
are based on the notion that preferences should in some sense be consistent across different choice problems, 
which are typically presented in an axiomatic form. Expected Utility is the most prominent normative theory of 
choice under uncertainty, proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. 
8 The most fundamental criticisms were made in the early 1950s by Allais. “Allais paradox” induced even 
staunch advocates of Expected Utility. 
9 Details would be discussed at a later part of this chapter. 






0 if          ),(5.2




xv  ,                                      ⑴ 
where x  is a change in wealth relative to the current status. This function means 
that gains are treated differently from losses at the reference point, e.g. current 
wealth. Adapting Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory, there is a 
tendency by individuals to weigh value losses 2.5 times more than gains. 
 
Drawing from Samuelson’s original gambling game as an illustration, the above 
function can be illustrated as follows: 
 S ⎩⎨
⎧
$100. -     5.0
$200       5.0
 
The above illustration would be rejected by Samuelson’s colleague since a loss 
outweighs the higher gain ( 0)100(5.05.22005.0 <−××+× ). However, if he were 
faced with a succession of two independent draws of S, his decision would depend 
on the “bracketing of the problem” (Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999). Given his 
myopia, he should evaluate and dislike each of the games. However, if he were to 





$200, -   25.0
$100       5.0
$400     0.25
 
the overall distribution might become acceptable ( ××+×+× 25.05.21005.040025.0  
)200(− >0). Therefore, the gambling game becomes more attractive through 
repetition of the single game evaluated in aggregate. 
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Benartzi and Thaler describe mental accounting as the dynamic aggregation rules 
that individuals follow and propose that the attractiveness of the gambling game 
depends on the evaluation period of the game. Individuals are averse to losses at an 
irrationally short horizon due to the behavioral bias that they are too anxious to 
evaluate on a short-term basis. Gollier (1996) analyzes the effects of the existence of 
options for gambling in the future and attempts to ascertain an optimal dynamic 
strategy towards repeated gambling. An undesirable gambling game can be made 
desirable by offering the opportunity to replay the same game10. 
 
2.2 Prospect Theory 
Life is full of uncertainty and unknowns, and individuals have to function within 
such a context and make decisions all the time. There is much work being done on 
making judgment and choice under uncertainty. Standard economic theory of choice 
under uncertainty differs from other disciplines in its treatment of normative and 
experimental models of behavior, that is, models that attempt to predict and explain 
the role of rationality in human behavior. Normative theories are based on the notion 
that preferences should in some sense be consistent across different choice sets, 
which are typically presented in an axiomatic form. Normative theories assume that 
human behavior is rational self-interested. A rational Expected Utility maximizer 
epitomizes the typical decision-maker (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has since dominated analysis of choice under 
                                                        
10 The gambling games are independent and identically distributed. 
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uncertainty, but it is not without critics. 
 
The most fundamental criticisms were made in the early 1950s by Allais. “Allais 
paradox”11 suggests that subjects tend to systematically violate the axiom of EUT. 
Numerous experiments have been designed to test the empirical validity of EUT. The 
experiments suggest that the predictions of EUT have been violated in various ways 
subject to a wide range of experimental violations. Experimental models are 
motivated by the desire to understand these “paradoxes” or “choice anomalies”. The 
distinction between normative and experimental theory is not as clear-cut as it seems. 
The majority of experimental models essentially retain certain valuable properties of 
EUT. Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992) is fundamentally a 
modification of EUT and differs on a very basic assumption, which explains some 
anomalies of EUT (Camerer & Thaler, 1995) by three elements: nonlinear weighting 
of probabilities (departing from the linear weighing as in EUT), reflection effects 
(outcome are evaluated not in absolute term, but rather compared with a reference 
point), and loss-aversion (losses compared with the reference point loom larger than 
gains). Moreover. There are two phases in the decision problem. In the first phase, 
the problem is “edited” in a certain frame (narrow or broad). Second, maximizing 
prospective value function the agent takes his decision. Usually, people called first 
phase as mental accounting. 
 
                                                        
11 See the details in the discussion in Allais (1979) and Slovic & Tversky (1974). 
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2.2.1 A Probability Weighting Function 
In a typical EUT setting, gambling that yields risky outcomes ix  with probability 
ip  is valued according to ( )ii xup  ∑ , where ( )xu  is utility function. In PT, it is 
valued by ( ) ( )∑ − rxvp ii  π , where ( )pπ  is weight function. The weight function 
( )pπ  maps stated probabilities to decision weights nonlinearly, but in reverse 







0.00          0.25          0.50          0.75         1.00
Weighting Function
 
                             Actual Probability 
Figure 1: A Probability Weighting Function 
 
This shape of line demonstrates probability misperception. Low probabilities are 
over-weighted and high probabilities are under-weighted. Subsequent works 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1992; Luce & Fishburn, 1991) replaced weights on 
individual probabilities by a transformation of the cumulative distribution function. 
 
Perceived Probability 
             
 14
2.2.2 The Reflection Effect 
The main assertion was the claim that “the carriers of value or utility are changes of 
wealth, rather than final asset positions that include current wealth” ((Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, p.273). Hence, the value function ( )rxv −  “should be treated as a 
function in two arguments: the asset position that serves as the reference point, and 




         VALUE
rLOSSES GAINS
 
Figure 2: A Hypothetical Value Function 
(Source from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) Figure 3) 
 
The value function also exhibits loss-aversion which means the effect of losses 
outweighs gains in the equal-sized value. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) 
proposed the following functional form for the value function: 







0 if         






λ                                   ⑵ 
where λ 1≥  is the degree of loss-aversion and 1, ≤βα  measures the degree of 
diminishing sensitivity. Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimated λ  to be 2.25 as 
the median values, and x  is the change from the reference point. 
 
The value function in PT is generally concave in the domain of gains and generally 
convex in the domain of losses. This attribute of the value functions is called the 
reflection effect around the reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which 
postulates that the risk aversion exhibited by choices when outcomes are gains will 
be transformed into a preference for risk when outcomes are losses. Accordingly, the 
value function has to be concave above the reference point 0/)( 22 <∂∂ xxv  for 
0>x , and convex below 0/)( 22 >∂∂ xxv  for 0<x . Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 
1992) regard this value function as having the feature of diminishing sensitivity 
because of concavity in gains and convexity in losses, which implies that the 
marginal utility of gains and losses decreases with their absolute size. Evaluating 
changes is not independent of the reference level. 
 
Suppose there is a decision-maker contemplating a gambling game that has a 
probability of p  to win x  and a probability of q  to lose y , he or she will 
evaluate the prospects and make a decision as to whether to play it or not. The 
overall value is obtained by the equation 
)()()()(),;,( yvqxvpqypxV ππ +=                                     ⑶ 
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where, either 1<+ qp  or 1=+ qp , the probability weighting function denotes 
0)0( =π  and 1)1( =π , and the value function denotes 0)( =rv 12. 
 
It has been shown that if individuals do not accept a fair game )5.0,;5.0,( aa − , their 
aversion to symmetric bets will increase with an increasing size of the stake (Heren, 
1997; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Now consider 0≥> yx , according to the 
equation, we should have )()()()( xvxvyvyv −+>−+  or 
)()()()( yvxvxvyv −>−−− . When ry = , we obtain )()( xvxv −−< . Hence, the 
value function has to be steeper for losses than for gains, which is called Loss 
Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
2.2.3 Loss Aversion 
Loss Aversion refers to losses being weighed higher than equivalent gains at the 
reference point, which is generally the current level of wealth. Individuals respond 
differently to losses from gains. They overvalue losses relative to comparable gains. 
Both experimental and empirical evidence clearly certifies the asymmetry in an 
individual’s evaluation of losses and gains. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) strong experimental evidence for Loss Aversion 
uses hypothetical payoffs, which raises the problem of whether loss aversion will 
                                                        
12 r  denotes reference point, which is current wealth here. 
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persist with economic incentives13. The design involves taking all gains in a choice 
pair and making decisions around them. Subjects tend to underweigh opportunity 
costs (foregone gains) relative to out-of-pocket costs (losses). Individuals generally 
feel a stronger impulse to avoid losses than to acquire gains. 
 
There are two important implications of reference point and loss aversion: 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), an over-evaluation of current possessions, and 
status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), an adoration of stability. The term 
status quo bias refers to the hypothesis that decision-makers exhibit a significant 
bias towards the status quo alternative. In simple words, the current state is favored 
over change. 
 
In economic theory, we assume a well-defined set of known alternatives from which 
individuals have to choose one. While real word seldom provides for an additional 
option: to do nothing or to keep the current state, the status quo option is an 
indispensable part of most decisions or situations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
 
Numerous experiments and field studies have demonstrated the existence of the 
status quo bias. In a very simple experiment conducted by Knetsch (1992), subjects 
were given either a mug or a pen (being of equal value). If the subjects would like to 
exchange their endowments, they would get an additional offer with a financial 
                                                        
13 Subjects would be strongly affected by the use of high economic incentives in the laboratory, compared with 
hypothetical payoffs. 
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incentive of 5 cents. However, the majority of both mug holders and pen holders 
kept what they had already received. 
 
Status quo bias can be seen as regret avoidance in real life. The idea behind regret 
avoidance is that individuals tend to stick to the current state because of past 
experience, which seems to suggest that options based on information apparently 
favorable at that point in time tend to lead to a less favorable outcome than 
previously assumed (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Furthermore, regret is higher 
for a bad outcome resulting from having made an active decision than for a bad 
outcome resulting from not having made a decision at all (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). Regret avoidance is associated with emotional costs, which arise from the 
uncertainty of what could happen with the decision moved away from the status quo. 
Basically, the pain of regret is associated with the fear of poor decision-making. 
Regret avoidance causes decision-makers to anticipate and feel the pain of regret that 
comes with a loss incurred (Pompian, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting, a term coined by Thaler (1980), is a phenomenon in which 
decision-makers set reference points for the accounts that determine gains and losses. 
Decision-making is an evolutionary process of preference construction rather than 
static preference revelation, and this process is contingent on the frame adopted 
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within the decision process. Framing can be considered the same as setting reference 
points. In general, the current asset position is assumed to be the reference point. 
However, “there are situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an 
expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, p. 286). 
 
Here lies the discrepancy between the reference point and the status quo if one does 
not adapt to recent changes. Human beings have to adopt certain strategies in order 
to get along with circumstances, which is the basic concept of the frame. One 
striking example of framing effects is offered by Tversky and Kahneman (1986), 
where the only difference in the problem of choice faced by the two groups in their 
experiments was the framing of the same outcome in different terms. This method 
has been duplicated in many other experimental studies (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & 
Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). It has been demonstrated that a change 
in frame can result in a change in preferences despite the fact that all key parameters 
of the problem of choice remain the same. 
 
Numerous experimental studies have suggested that individuals prefer narrow 
framing when doing their mental accounting. Narrow framing means 
decision-makers paying attention to narrowly-framed gains and losses, which could 
reflect a concern for non-consumption sources of utility (Grinblatt & Han, 2005), 
such as regret. If individuals play slot machines and keep losing for quite a while, 
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they may experience a sense of regret over the decision to continue playing. In other 
words, previous gains and losses can be carriers of utility in their own right, and 
decision-makers take this into account when making decisions. 
 
In this thesis, we study the behavior towards gambling games with a high probability 
for trivial losses, as exemplified in the following game: 
M  ⎩⎨
⎧
$10.-      96.0
 $140      04.0
 
We assume that decision makers are averse to loss and are subject to narrow framing 
in their mental accounting. We consider two impacts of myopia, that of the 
evaluation period and the presentation mode on individuals’ decisions, to investigate 
the causal mechanisms. 
 
2.3 The Impact of Myopia 
Myopia Loss Aversion (MLA), which combines Prospect Theory and Mental 
Accounting, is employed to understand the effects of a decision-maker’s willingness 
to gamble. In the previous section, decision-makers with MLA treat attractive 
multiple plays as unattractive. 
 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that MLA might be responsible for the fact that 
individuals are willing to invest in bonds despite a long evaluation horizon. Thaler et 
al. (1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003), and 
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Haigh and List (2005) provided experimental tests that confirm the evaluation period 
as one impact of myopia. By manipulating the investment horizon, they have found a 
significant increase in the subjects’ willingness to diversify their portfolios. Benartzi 
and Thaler (1999) explored the impact of myopia by using different presentation 
modes. When shown explicit distribution of multiple plays, the subjects displayed an 
increased willingness to gamble. However, Langer and Weber (2001) pointed out 
that the relation between presentation modes and myopia is not as simple as that 
presented by Benartzi and Thaler (1999); it depends on special parameters. The 
presentation mode is another important impact on myopia. 
 
2.3.1 Evaluation Periods 
Individuals who reject a single gambling game with a fair chance to win $200 and 
lose $100 are characterized by loss aversion and have a negative value of Expected 
Utility to one gambling game14 (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). The same individuals, 
however, will have a higher tendency to accept two games if given the following 
option: 0)500(/)100(/)400(/ 412141 >−++ . That being the case, individuals who 
evaluate their portfolios often tend to revise their investments of low mean and low 
risk and be drawn to government bonds as these become more attractive. Merton 
(1969) and Samuelson (1963) concluded that individuals near retirement dislike 
risky investments such as equities. The intuition comes from the notion that when 
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evaluation periods decrease, there would be considerable shortfalls from stocks 
investment, while over long evaluation periods, the probability that the gain on 
stocks will exceed the gain on bonds increases substantially. 
 
The net probability of winning for multiple plays is perceived to be higher. For a 
simple example, the net probability of losing twice is only one-fourth while the net 
probability of losing once is one-half. Individuals would pay more attention to the 
probability of loss. Consequently, when individuals do not evaluate investment 
decisions often, they are more willing to accept riskier asset allocations. Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) assert that the attractiveness of a risky investment relative to the less 
risky bonds largely depends on the time horizon of the investor and on the frequency 
of his evaluating his portfolio. The longer the investor wishes to hold on to stocks, 
the more attractive they become, as long as the evaluation of the investment is not 
updated on a regular basis. Loss aversion together with a frequent evaluation period 
of risky investment increases risk aversion. 
 
2.3.1.1 The Model 
This section analyzes Loss Aversion and Mental Accounting (LA / MA) within long 
and short evaluation periods. The LA/MA model was first proposed by Barberis, 
Huang, and Santos (2001) to explain low correlation between stock returns and stock 
consumption growth. In their model, the investor derives direct utility not only from 
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consumption but also from changes in the value of his financial wealth. We note that 
there are some following theorems similar to theirs, as Gabaixm et al (2006), 
Fielding and Stracca (2007), Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and Hyde (2007) etc. In this 
study, their model is simplified to analyze the player with loss aversion over 
fluctuations. The framework here is used in a more uncomplicated economic 
scenario than asset markets. A more basic difference is that they assume a substantial 
level of risk aversion in their model while our model draws more on the degree of 
loss aversion in psychology literature. We now provide a simple theorem. 
 
In particular, at time t  an agent chooses tC  consumption and an allocation ts   

















                  ⑷ 
ρ    is the time discount factor  
0>γ  controls the curvature of utility over consumption, for 1=γ , )1/(1 γγ −−tC  
is replayed by tClog   
htx +   measures returns at time ht + , where h  is the evaluation time horizon 
tz   measures the player’s gains or losses on the gamble prior to evaluation 
period t , and is a function of consumption level tC  to the gamble
16 
 
In this preference specification, the first term tC , utility over consumption, is not 
                                                        
15 In Benartzi and Thaler (1995), gambling could be regarded as stocks and bonds. In Benartzi and Thaler (1999), 
it has been substituted as retirement investments. In this thesis, it is the game of gambling machines. 
16 Z(t) depends on current consumption level C(t), because if the player kept losing in gambling, z(t) is easily 
equal to C(t). And the same time the gain from gambling also can be transferred as linear function of 
consumption level. 
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required in the framework. However, it is necessary to considering the co-variability 
with consumption rather just focusing on the prospects for returns. Barberis and 
Huang (2001). The second term is the focus of this model, which describes the idea 
that Loss Aversion changes over previous gains and losses. The variable tz  is the 
“historical benchmark level”, adopted in this study as the player’s reference point 
based on an earlier outcome. When ( ) 0>− ttt Czs , the player has accumulated 
prior gains on playing gambling. When ( ) 0<− ttt Czs  , the player has had past 
losses.  
 
This allows us to capture experimental demonstration that prior playing performance 
affects the way subsequent outcomes are experienced by introducing the variable tz . 
The value function v  proposed by (Fielding and Stracca, 2007) can be defined in 
the following way. 
 
When ( )ttt Czs =   
    ( )
0
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          ( ) kCzss tttt +=− λλ ],[  ,                                  ⑻ 
and 0>k . 
 
It is much easier to comprehend these equations graphically. In Figure 3, the solid 
line is for ( )ttt Czs = , the dash-dot line for ( ) 0>− ttt Czs , and the dashed line for 
( ) 0<− ttt Czs . When ( )ttt Czs = , the case where the players do not have either 
prior gains or losses, v  is a simple linear function with a slope of one in the 



















Figure 3: Utility of Gains and Losses  
Source from Barberis and Huang (2001), Figure 1 
 
When ( ) 0>− ttt Czs , players have accumulated prior gains. The form of this case 
is quite similar to the previous one except that the kink is not at the origin but to the 
left; with the distance to the left being dependent on the size of prior gains 
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( )ttt Czs − . This line captures the concept that prior gains may buffer later losses, 
and it shows that players treat small losses at the gentle rate of one, rather than λ : 
because prior gains cushion these losses, they are less painful. 
The last case when ( ) 0<− ttt Czs , individuals are losing in the game. The line has 
a kink at the original just like the first case, but losses are penalized at a high rate 
compared with λ . This is the idea that it is much more painful when losses come 
after other losses. The degree of loss aversion is demonstrated by equation ⑻. The 
implication of equation ⑻ is an assumption that the evolution of degree of loss 
aversion ( )],[ tttt Czss −λ  is affected not only affected by prior outcomes but also 
the current situation of the game.  
 
Although we have similar question with Barberis, Huang, and Santos’ (2001), we do 
not intend to replicate the result of LA/MA model, and there are two main respects 
differing from theirs. First, excess returns on gambling games rather than on its 
absolute return is defined in our value function, where excess returns represent the 
price paid for gambling games. We wish to focus specifically on the characteristics 
of this price and what it reveals about attitudes towards losses. Second, our aim is to 
find out the evaluation time horizon h  with value function as in (4), and given a 
value of λ , is different from ( )],[ tttt Czss −λ . We look at the combinations 
( ){ }hCzss tttt ],,[ −λ  to find what happens to loss aversion degree if h  is assumed 
differently. This sensitivity analysis is the main objective of this study, which has a 
significant psychological effect on people’s choice and we analyze this effect in the 
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next section. 
2.3.1.2 Gambling Variations of the Model 
Scenario 1 
The example discussed in Samuelson’s (1963) conveys the sense that different 
criteria may apply to decisions made about single and multiple plays. For example, 
the net probability of winning bets twice: 
S ⎩⎨
⎧
$100 -     5.0
$200       5.0
 
rises to 0.75 (0.5+0.25). The net probability of winning in such gambling would rise 
along with the number of repeated times. People show greater sensitivity to the 
amount lost when they play once than when they play more than once as in the latter, 
losses are spread out over the number of repeated times by a raised net probability of 
winning. As a consequence, such risky gambling, whose net probability of winning 
in multiple playing is acceptably high, becomes more attractive in a longer 
evaluation period (Lopes, 1981). The betting game, which has a probability of 2/3 of 
losing the amount bet and a probability of 1/3 of winning two and a half times the 
amount bet in some experimental settings (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy & Potters, 
1997; Haigh & List, 2005) both belongs to this type. 
 
Compared with frequent evaluation, infrequent evaluation would tend to cushion the 
potential of losses. As most studies suggest, longer evaluation periods make 
individuals willing to gamble. With reference to our model, we will be analyzing 
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equation ⑸. Individuals could have a higher risk portfolio. Where the gambling has 
a high probability for trivial losses as discussed in this study, and if the net 
probability of winning in multiple plays is considerably low, the outcome would be 
different, and equation ⑹ should be utilized. 
 
Scenario 2 
Equation ⑹  will be utilized if we assume that accumulated prior losses on 
gambling are important. Most gamblers who play slot machines know the high 
probability for trivial losses and are past losers. The last case in the model implies 
that prior losses have an effect on subsequent decisions. We attempt to identify the 
causal mechanisms through which evaluation periods make individuals more willing 
to accept subsequent games. A difference in the evaluation frequency will influence 
and change the degree of aversionλ . To illustrate, let us consider a slot machine 
player with an initial endowment of $200 as his reference point. He plays $50 in the 
first round. After a few minutes, he loses $50. If he is risk-seeking in the domain of 
losses, he will continue to play until his endowment is gone. 
 
A short break, on the other hand, could induce the gambler to ponder the loss of the 
initial $50 and adjust his reference point. Now let us assume that after inserting $5, 
he is allowed to adjust his reference point as soon as he loses the money. If after he 
inserts 4 times and loses $20, his new reference point will be adjusted downwards. 
Since further losses have a more marked effect, the gambler is expected to exhibit an 
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increasing degree of risk aversion and eventually quit (Traub, 1999, p51). To put it 
another way, we think it reasonable to interpret degree of risk aversion changes with 
the losses that one might face.  
 
The different degrees of loss aversion caused by distinct evaluation periods for this 
type of gambling allow us to state the following: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. For gambling with a high probability for trivial losses, increasing 
evaluation frequency leads to greater dissatisfaction, which will mediate the effect of 
prospect framing on decision makers’ willingness to accept multiple prospects. 
 
Despite the simplicity of the argument, an experiment has been designed to test the 
above proposition. Central to this proposition is the dependence on the individual’s 
reference point. If gamblers’ reference points are high, different evaluation periods 
will not have an impact. 
 
2.3.2 Presentation Modes 
Benartzi and Thaler (1999) found that aversion to short-term losses can be overcome 
by providing explicit distribution of potential outcomes. Explicit distribution could 
be treated as a particular case of “narrow framing” (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) 
effect. An aggregated presentation mode makes the portfolio more attractive. 
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However, Langer and Weber (2001) found that the impact arising from the greater 
attractiveness of the aggregated presentation mode cannot be generalized as previous 
literature seems to suggest. It was found that for gambling with a low probability for 
high losses, a lower acceptance rate would result even when the overall distribution 
was displayed. We now discuss specific types of gambling with a high probability 
for trivial losses and the influence of aggregated or segregated presentation modes 
on the acceptance rate. 
 
2.3.2.1 The Lottery Space 
The Lottery Space (Langer & Weber, 2001) is a very useful method for discussing 
various types of probability and size of loss. Langer and Weber exclusively consider 





           
       1
                
Defining Δ  as a fixed difference between two outcomes – loss and gain, a pair 
( )lp  ,  of loss probability and loss size can describe any mixed gambling with 
fixedΔ . In this study, we assume Δ  to be 150, i.e., 150+= lg  because we want 
the gambling game 
⎩⎨
⎧
$50-     5.0
$100     5.0
 
used in the study of Benartzi and Thaler (1999) to be included in our analysis. Given 
the Δ  restriction, our general lottery space can be denoted as 
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( ) [ ]{ }]1,0[,0 ,150 ,: 150 ∈−∈=ℜ pllp . The gambling games in 150ℜ  can be shown in 







-1500                  0.2               0.4               0.6               0.8                1
Gamble K used by Benartzi & Thaler
Gamble M
 
                     probability of p  
Figure 4: The Lottery Space 150ℜ 17 
 
Each point within the rectangle corresponds exactly to one lottery in 150ℜ . The bets 
with sure gains and losses are respectively located at the left and right boundary. The 
expected value increases by moving up and to the left. The point K = (0.5, -50) 
corresponds to the gambling game used by Benartzi and Thaler. The point M = (0.96, 
-10), denoting the gamble: 
M ⎩⎨
⎧
$10.-      96.0
 $140      04.0
 
is an example of gambling with a high loss probability and a trivial loss size, which 
                                                        
17 Adjustment of Figure 3.1 in Langer and Weber (2001). 
size of loss 
l 
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is a typical type of gambling game carried out on gambling machines. 
2.3.2.2 Differences in Aggregated and Segregated Evaluation 
In the aggregated presentation mode of a portfolio consisting of two games ( )lp  ,  , 
there are three outcomes 2 l , gl + , and 2 g . The values of these outcomes are 
respectively given as MGL AAA  and , , , where 
( ) ( ) ( )glvAgvAlvA MGL +===  and ,2 ,2 . 
As such MGL ppp  and , ,  are used to denote the probabilities for the pure loss, the 
pure gain, and the mixed case. The value of aggregated presentation mode is given 
as: 
GGMMLL ApApApA ⋅+⋅+⋅= .                                         ⑼ 
It is easy to deduce the value of the segregated presentation mode: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]gvplvpS ⋅−+⋅= 12                                            ⑽ 
Defining )(2 lvSL ⋅= , )(2 gvSG ⋅= , and )()( gvlvSM += , equation ⑽  can be 
rewritten as: 
MMGGLL SpSpSpS ⋅+⋅+⋅= .                                        ⑾ 
Here, we obtain the total difference D  between these two evaluation modes: 
MMGGLL DpDpDpSAD ⋅+⋅+⋅=−= ,                                 ⑿ 
where, )(2)2( lvlvSAD LLL ⋅−⋅=−= , 
      )(2)2( gvgvSAD GGG ⋅−⋅=−=  
      )()()( gvlvglvSAD MMM −−+=−=  
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Langer and Weber (2001) proved for all gambling in the interior of 150ℜ , D  is 
always positive, because 0)(2)2( =⋅−⋅= lvlvDL , 0)(2)2( =⋅−⋅= gvgvDG  and 
=MD lv( + )()() gvlvg −− =1.5 } ,{min lg⋅ . Neither the loss part nor the gain part 
contributes to the overall evaluation difference while the mixed part is positive for 
all lotteries in the interior of 150ℜ . Their proof is consistent with Benartzi and 
Thaler’s (1999) assertion that the aggregated presentation mode is more attractive 
than the segregated one. In Figure 5, we present Iso-D lines in a ( )lp  ,  coordinate 
system in the space 150ℜ . It is clear that D is always positive everywhere and 
converges to 0 only at the boundaries of the space, where pure gain or loss in 











Gamble K used by Benartzi & T haler
Gamble M
 
size of loss 
l 
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                      probability of loss p  
Figure 5: Iso-D Lines in the Lottery Space 150ℜ 18 
Returning to the special gambling (high probability for trivial loss), we need to 
re-prove this problem. 
 
2.3.2.3 The Case of Gambling with High Probability for Trivial Loss 
For this special gambling, the value function in the segregated presentation mode is 
different from that in the aggregated one. Because the loss is trivial, individuals 
would not consider the expectation of the loss when they gamble only once, although 
the odds for winning are quite small. The expectation value in the segregated 
presentation mode is always positive. In other words, individuals indifferently pay a 
small amount to gamble, given the chance of winning something and as long as there 
is hope of winning. 
 
However, in the aggregated presentation, we cannot simply ignore the expected 
values of losses. The total losses would not be trivial for gamblers with a low 
reference point. The aggregated evaluation process does not change. The total 
difference between these two modes for this special gambling is given by: 
( ) MMGGGLL APSAPAPD +−⋅+⋅=                                    ⒀ 
Equation ⒀ is different from equation ⑿. LA  is always negative, thus leading to 
Proposition 2: 
                                                        
18 Adjustment of Figure 3.3 in Langer and Weber (2001). 
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PROPOSITION 2: For gambling with a high probability for trivial losses, there exists 
repeated n  times of gambling in ℜ  with a negative evaluation difference D , i.e., 
with a higher segregated than aggregated evaluation. The larger n  is, the less 
attractiveness there is for aggregated evaluation. 
 
This is an intuitive result. Repeated plays are independent of each other. If the odds 
for winning are quite small, the later two parts in the above equation would be very 
small with the increase in repeated times. At the same time, increasing the size of the 
amount lost would have a greater effect on evaluation. If n  is not big enough, the 
















                    probability of loss p  
Figure 6: Iso-D lines in the Lottery Space  150ℜ  for Gambles with High Probability for 
size of loss 
l 




While these thoughts are informal, an Iso-D diagram can clarify the point (see Figure 
6). The isoline for D=0 is the boundary between D>0 and D<0. All gambling with 
D<0 in the ℜ  space should thus look more attractive in a segregated evaluation. In 
this figure, we assume that individuals think $50 is inexpensive19. 
 
2.3.2.4 Extension 
If we generalize the value function to reflect diminishing sensitivity together with 
loss aversion, we can still separate D  into L , G  and M . Using the value 
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Assuming βα =  , 1≥k  and 1, ≤βα , the two-parameter form αkv  
demonstrates how the two concepts (loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity) 
influence the overall evaluation difference. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated 
the parameters βα , and k  and identified 88.0== βα  and 25.2=k  as median 
values. We will use these parameters for our calculations. 
 
Because of the concavity in gains and the convexity in losses, the components 
)(2)2( lvlvDL ⋅−⋅=  and −⋅= )2( gvDG )150(2)3002()(2 +⋅−+=⋅ lvlvgv  are 
                                                        
19 The Iso-line depends on how much money individuals think that they indifferently pay to play or win a chance, 
e.g. if individuals think it is expensive to play more than $30, Iso-line will stop at the loss of $15. 
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decreasing function in l (see Figure 6). Langer and Weber (2001) proved that mixed 
gambling in ℜ  exists with a negative evaluation difference D , which means that a 
segregated evaluation is more attractive than an aggregated one. 




Figure 7: )(lDG  for 25.2=k   and 88.0== βα 20 
 
However, current methodology does not shed light on this type of gambling as we 
need to assume an increase in the gambling. It is still possible to separate the 
evaluation difference D  as in the previous part, but this is very complex. Because 
of the complexity of each value component, a detailed formal analysis is not 
presented in this thesis. We will only visualize the effect of increasing the portfolio 
size in Iso- D  diagrams. 
 
In the previous section, we ignore the mixed M -part of the evaluation difference 
D  and only focus on the term LGD . Langer and Weber (2001) have formalized the 
notion in an aggregated evaluation mode. We limit ourselves to describing the 
essential structure. Here, we only need to know that a certain range MD  has 
negative value. The consequence of increasing loss aversion is given in Figure 8. 
                                                        
20 Adjustment of Figure 3.4 in Langer and Weber (2001). 
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The proportion of the lottery space ℜ  with a negative evaluation difference D  
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Figure 8:  150ℜ  with Iso-D lines for gambles with High Probability for Trivial Loss for   
25.2=k  and 88.0== βα  
 
2.3.2.5 Probability Weighting 
Probability Weighting Function refers to the assignment of high weights to low 
probabilities and low weights to high probabilities. In the case of the gambling 
discussed in this study, the aversion to an aggregated evaluation of repeated 
gambling is weakened if probability weighting is incorporated. That is because the 
small probability of a win is over-weighted and the high probability of a loss is 
under-weighted. Some gamblers even expect the probability of winning to increase 
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with the length of an ongoing run of losses (Wagenaar, 1988). Cumulative Prospect 
Theory cannot be used to compute the probabilities. It can at best be summarized as 
overconfidence and an unwarranted faith in one’s intuitive reasoning, judgments and 
cognitive abilities (Pompian, 2006). Thus, individuals with such probability 
weighting would not reduce the acceptance rate when provided with aggregated 
information. 




This chapter describes two experiments devised to explore whether the evaluation 
period and the presentation mode make a difference in an individual’s willingness to 
accept mixed gambling with a high probability for trivial losses. The next section 
reports Study 1 which investigates risk-taking behavior with different evaluation 
periods, and Study 2 which describes an experiment on single and repeated gambling 
in two presentation modes. 
 
3.1 Study 1: Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods 
3.1.1 Design and Procedure 
3.1.1.1 Design 
To ascertain whether an individual’s behaviour towards gambling with a high 
probability for trivial losses is consistent with the MLA conjecture, a straightforward 
2×2 experimental design was used (see TableⅠ) as another important goal of our 
research is to explore whether status quo bias makes more treatment effect, i.e. the 
difference between Treatment F and Treatment I. Using a between-person 
experimental design, we included both subjects with money given before the games 
(Status quo Group) and subjects with money exchanged after the games (Endowment 
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Group) in two distinct treatments: Treatment F (denoting frequent feedback) and 
Treatment I (denoting infrequent feedback). To ensure comparability with extant 
literature, we followed Gneezy and Potters (1997) when crafting our experimental 
protocol, and only changed the parameters of the type of gambling. The approach 
with two subject types is duplicated from Haigh and List (2005). 
 
Table I: Experiment Design of Study 121 
Subject Type Treatment F Treatment I 
Students (Status quo Group) 30 30 
Students (Endowment Group) 30 30 
 
We designed the experiment to investigate the following hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. For both the Status quo Group and the Endowment Group, subjects 
in Treatment I will bet more than subjects in Treatment F. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The Treatment effect, i.e. the difference between Treatment I and 
Treatment F, among the Status quo Group is more pronounced than that among the 
Endowment Group. 
 
                                                        
21 Numbers represent sample sizes. Treatment F had subjects placing bets in nine rounds; after each round, the 
subjects were informed of the outcome. Treatment I was identical except that the subjects placed bets for three 
rounds at a time rather than for each round. The Status quo Group received money before they placed their bets, 
while the Endowment Group exchanged cents for money after they placed their bets. 
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In the experiment22, the subjects were confronted with a sequence of twelve identical 
but independent rounds of a betting game. For the Status quo Group, at the 
beginning of the experiment, every subject received an envelope with 45 CNY 
(Chinese Yuan) inside. They were told that they had to use the money given to bet23 
and that the amount given would not be their final earnings as the latter would 
depend on their decisions in the experiment. In each of the first nine rounds (Part 1 
of the experiment), subjects had to decide how much they wanted to bet in the game. 
The amounts tx were restricted as 1000 ≤≤ tx ( )9,...,2,1=t . For the Endowment 
Group, the subjects were endowed with 100 cents per first nine rounds and they 
decided what portion of this endowment [0,100]24 they desired to bet. At the end of 
the experiment, the cents subjects gained from betting game would be exchange into 
money25. The game has a probability of 12/13 of losing the amount bet and a 
probability of 1/13 of winning 10 times the amount bet.  
 
We do believe that the difference between these two groups could make a deviation 
from what they bet in gambling games. Since in Status quo Group, the money to be 
distributed for the players before playing is like their properties when using it in the 
game. Facing losses of their owe properties, people get more aversion. Oppositely, in 
Endowment Group, the money to be paid after the game, subjects consider it “manna 
from heaven”, and it seems rather uncontroversial to assume that people feel pain 
                                                        
22 Detailed experimental instructions are contained in Appendix A. 
23 At the time of the experiment, 1 CNY was exchanged for 20 cents. Thus, they had 900 cents to bet. 
24 It is important to stress that the subjects could not bet using the money accumulated in previous rounds. 
25 At the time of the experiment, 100 cents exchanged for 5.00 CNY.  
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when losing.   
 
As illustrated in the experimental instructions contained in Appendix A, the subjects 
were made aware of the probabilities, payoffs, and the fact that the game would be 
played after all the subjects had made their choice for that round. It is important to 
stress that the subjects could not bet any amount bigger than 100 cents. In round 10 
through 12 (Part 2 of the experiment), the subjects were no longer under any 
restrictions. They had to make bets from the money earned in Part 1. 
 
The main feature of the design is that there were two different treatments: Treatment 
F (frequent feedback) and Treatment I (infrequent feedback). In Treatment F, the 
subjects played the rounds one by one. In each of the rounds, they had to choose how 
much to bet. They were then informed about the realization of the game in that round. 
Only then could they decide how much to bet for the next round. In Treatment I, the 
subjects placed their bets in blocks of three. Rather than placing their round bet and 
realizing the round outcome before proceeding to the next round, in Treatment I, the 
subjects decided in rounds 1, 4 and 7. Duplicating Gneezy and Potters (1997), these 
bets were considered homogeneous across the three rounds. Most importantly, after 
the subjects placed their bets, they were informed about the combined realization of 
the three rounds. This differs from our assignment of gains and losses after each 
round in Treatment F which provides heterogeneity in the evaluation period. Hence, 
the subjects in Treatment I were supplied with less freedom and less information 
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than those in Treatment F. In Part 2, Treatment I made one decision only at round 10. 
 
The basic idea behind the two treatments of this design is to manipulate the 
evaluation period. In Treatment I, the frequency of decision and information 
feedback was lower than in Treatment F. Previous results have shown remarkable 
effects on betting behavior with this simple framing change. To cite an example, 
using Dutch undergraduate students, Gneezy and Potters (1997) found that the 
average percentage of the endowment bet is significantly higher in the low frequency 
feedback treatment compared to the high frequency feedback treatment: 67.4% 
versus 50.5%. Haigh and List (2005) proved that both students and professional 
traders exhibit behavior that is consistent with MLA, and the effect observed among 
traders is much more pronounced than among students. 
 
3.1.1.2 Procedure 
As summarized in Table Ⅰ, we recruited 60 undergraduate students from Hubei 
University in China as the Status quo Group. Another 60 students from Shanghai 
Jiaotong University were recruited as the Endowment Group. In these two 
universities, we had six experimental sessions, three for each of the two treatments. 
An announcement in the university bulletins solicited participants for a 
decision-making experiment of about 40 minutes, with a reward that would depend 
on their decisions, but which was likely to be somewhere between 20 and 30 CNY. 
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For each session, 12 subjects were invited, 10 of whom would participate in the 
betting games, one would act as an assistant, and another would be held in reserve in 
the event of a no-show. 
 
The experiment was administrated by pen and paper, and held in a seminar room 
with the subjects seated far apart to ensure that decisions remained anonymous and 
independent. Communication between the subjects was prohibited and they could 
not observe another individual’s decisions and payoffs. After entering the room, a 
short standard-type introduction was read to the subjects by the experimenter. The 
subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts. After the 
introduction, each subject unfolded the paper on the table. Ten forms were numbered 
Registration Forms for the experiment; one form had “assistant” printed on it, and 
another was a blank form26. The assistant was told that he would receive a payment 
equal to the average earnings of the other participants. The subject who drew the 
blank form was paid 25 CNY for appearing and was asked to leave the room. 
 
The ten subjects were then required to record their first bets. The gambling game 
was carried out by the assistant. Whether participants won or lost in any given round 
of the game depended on their personal winning card. Participants won if their 
winning card matched the round card that was drawn by the assistant, and lost if 
their winning card did not match the round card. Every subject has his or her own 
                                                        
26 This form was removed when only eleven subjects showed up. 
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“winning card” which was indicated on the Registration Form. The outcome of the 
random events (the round card drawn) was announced publicly, and the subjects 
were aware only of their own bets and whether they had won or lost. Since there 
were thirteen poker cards from A to K in the box from which only one would match 
a subject’s winning card, the probability of winning in any round was 1/13, and the 
probability of losing was 12/13. 
 
In Treatment I, the subjects fixed their bets for three rounds, which were conducted 
by the assistant. In order to provide a combined realization of the three rounds, the 
assistant used three boxes labeled A, B, and C, with each containing 13 poker cards 
from A to K. The assistant first showed the contents of each box to the subjects, and 
then shook the boxes and randomly took one card out of each box. The three cards 
drawn (one for each round) were then simultaneously given to the subjects. 
 
After each round (three rounds in Treatment I), the subjects calculated and recorded 
their own earnings on their Registration Form. We examined these calculations to 
make certain that they understood the procedure, and that they did not cheat. Then 
the subjects recorded their bets for the next round (next three rounds in Treatment I). 
 
3.1.2 Results of Study 1 
Our key comparative static result is an examination of behavioral differences across 
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frequent and infrequent treatments; simultaneously we compared the treatment effect 
between subject types. To maintain consistency with previous literature, we 
compared betting levels in Figure 9 since MLA predicts that the average bet in 
Treatment I should be more than the average bet in Treatment F. 
 
The gambling behavior summarized in Figure 9 is consistent with MLA. In both 
groups, the subjects in Treatment I placed more in betting, which are homological 
with previous empirical findings (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Haigh & List, 2005). In 
Treatment F, the subjects in the Status quo Group bet on average 20.42 units versus 
40.51 units for the same group in Treatment I. The subjects in the Endowment Group 
put on average 24.46 units into betting in Treatment F while they bet nearly 38 units 
in Treatment I. Figure 9 also indicates that the effect among Status quo Group is 















Status quo Group Endowment Group
Treatment F Treatment I
 
Figure 9: Comparing Betting Patterns 
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Following Gneezy and Potters (1997), we took the average amount in blocks of three 
rounds to avoid data-dependency problems and to ease comparison with the data in 
Treatment I. To determine the significance of the differences, we used a 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney statistical test27. 
 
Table II: Data Summary of Study 1 
 Average Bet 
 Status quo Group Status quo Group Endowment Group Endowment Group 
 Treatment Fa Treatment Ia Treatment Fa Treatment Ia 
Rounds 1-3 18.63(7.46) 42.37(24.56) 21.85(8.24) 40.15(24.48) 
Rounds 4-6 18.57(9..01) 41.97(20.68) 22.88(9.69) 39.12(21.29) 
Rounds 7-9 20.42(9.32) 40.58(16.23) 24.15(10.12) 37.85(20.49) 
Rounds 10-12 24.08(8.09) 37.07(26.88) 28.95(10.52) 35.05(22.57) 
Rounds 1-9 19.20(8.64) 41.64(20.37) 22.96(9.54) 39.04(22.18) 
 Mann-Whitney z -Statistics 
 Status quo Group Endowment Group 
 Treatment F versus Treatment Ib Treatment F versus Treatment Ib 
Rounds 1-3 -4.24(0.000) -3.87(0.000) 
Rounds 4-6 -4.08(0.000) -3.02(0.003) 
Rounds 7-9 -3.44(0.001) -1.93(0.048) 
Rounds 10-12 -1.74(0.081) -1.49(0.152) 
Rounds 1-9 -3.89(0.000) -2.84(0.057) 
a. #obs. =61(62) for Treatment F(I). Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
b. One-tail significance levels ( p -values) are in brackets. 
                                                        
27 Because the observations in our experiment were not from a normal distribution by using Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test, we were not able to use the parametric t -test.  
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Columns 1-4 in the upper panel summarize the Status quo Group and the 
Endowment Group’s betting behavior over all the rounds. Columns in the lower 
panel present Mann-Whitney tests on the differences in behavior across the different 
treatment types. We reported one-tail significance levels at the 05.0<p  with this 
test. For every block of three rounds, average bets are larger for Treatment I. 
 
However, this pattern in the result was not as significant as other rounds in Rounds 
10-12 (Part 2 in experimental setting). This phenomenon might be caused by the fact 
that the subjects knew that the betting games would be over after this part, and 
therefore those who were not unduly concerned about what they had already earned 
in Part 1 would put all they had into the betting and those who wanted to bring 
something back from the experiment exhibited more aversion to risk and only bet 
little or even nothing. Thus, the observations in Part 2 were cancelled when average 
bets across all rounds (only Rounds 1-9) were discussed. Table Ⅱ demonstrates an 
insight: The Status quo Group exhibits greater treatment effect than the Endowment 
Group. This result is consistent with our theory analysis. 
 
The Status quo Group received 45 CNY before taking part in the experiment while 
the Endowment Group could only exchange the cents they gained from the 
experiment for money after the experiment. The Status quo Group predicts 
exhibiting regret avoidance. Thus the degree of loss aversion should be different. It 
seems that the design is effective in changing the subjects’ degree of loss aversion 
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between different groups. This would also suggest another hypothesis that 
experiencing losses affects risk behavior. Using a backward-looking hypothesis, it 
was expected that the treatment effect would be stronger in the final rounds than in 
the first rounds. No support for this is observed in the data. However, the 
significantly different treatment effects between different groups support Proposition 
1. Table Ⅲ provides a robustness analysis. A panel data regression model was used 
to regress the individual bet on a dummy variable for subject pool and a dummy 
variable for treatment. It is a simple Tobit regression model28. The dependent 
variable is the individual bet. “Status quo Group” is the omitted subject category and 
therefore represents the baseline group. Endowment Group * Treatment F is the 
Endowment Group indicator variable that interacts with the frequent feedback 
treatment variable. 
 
Table III: Regression Results 
Variable Constant 
Endowment 
  Group 
Treatment F 
Endowment Group 
* Treatment F 
2R  2χ (3 d.f.) N 
Tobit 51.74* -10.73 -24.98* 9.87* 
Model (2.89) (3.63) (4.57) (3.63) 
0.34 70.48* 1080
Notes: The 2χ  values provide evidence of the explanatory power of the model. Standard errors are in 
parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. 
* Denotes significance at the 05.0<p  level. 
 
Our regression results further support the conclusions from the raw data. For 
                                                        
28 Details are discussed in Haigh & List (2005) and Long (1997). The Tobit model is sometimes referred to as 
the censored regression model. The Tobit model uses all of the information, including information about the 
censoring. In this study, we censored the treatment effect in the Endowment Group comparing it with the Status 
quo Group as baseline group. 
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example, we find that in the Status quo Group, the subjects in Treatment F bet 24.98 
fewer units than those in Treatment I, and this difference is significant at the 
01.0<p  level. The difference is weaker for the Endowment Group where 
Treatment F subjects bet approximately 15(9.87-24.98) fewer units than Treatment I 
subjects, which is significant evidence. This finding could be found from the 
coefficient estimate of the Endowment Group * Treatment F interaction term in Table 
Ⅲ, which is significant at the 05.0<p  level. 
 
From the results of Study 1, our data support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. For 
both the Status quo Group and the Endowment Group, the subjects in Treatment F 
bet less than those in Treatment I owing to different evaluation periods. Furthermore, 
the difference between Treatment F and Treatment I within the Status quo Group was 
more obvious than that within the Endowment Group. This observation may be 
caused by status quo bias when real money is put to the task. 
 
3.2 Study 2: Repeated Gambling and Presentation Modes 
3.2.1 Design of Study 2 
To determine whether individuals have preference reversal when they are faced with 
different presentation modes, a comparison of acceptance rates was used 
(Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992). We can easily hypothesize how the sign of the 
difference in acceptance rates should depend on the risk profiles of the gambling 
             
 52
involved. It is a major strength of this method that subjects are confronted with very 
simple choice situations and are not unduly influenced by coding or other framing 
effects. This method was set up to verify the basic predictions of our theoretical 
analysis for presentation modes. A 2×3 design was chosen as presented in Table Ⅳ. 
 
Table IV: The 2×3 Design of Study 229 
        Portfolio 
 
Type of bet 
Single Segregated mode Aggregated mode 
$10-      %96
$140    %4 +M  X X X 
$10.32-      %93
80        %7 +V  X X X 
 
To investigate the role of Myopic Loss Aversion, two gambling games that have 
approximately the same expected value but different components were constructed. 
The entry M/Single is a type of game M with 4% probability to win $14030 and 96% 
probability to lose $10. The entry M/Segregated mode is a portfolio consisting of 10 
times of game M while M/Aggregated mode is a portfolio providing an overall 
distribution of 10 times of game M. The entry of row V is the same as row M. For 
these two types of gambling games, we predict: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. The acceptance rate for playing game M or V ten times will be lower 
                                                        
29 The expected value of M and V is exactly the same ane equal to $4. 
30 For participants in China, the amount was changed to ￥140, the following accordingly.  
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compared with the acceptance rate for playing only once. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. The acceptance rate for playing game M or V ten times will be lower 
if the overall distribution of the final outcomes is explicitly mentioned. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. Subjects overestimate the probability of losing money in repeated 
plays and overestimate the amount of gain in single play. 
 
The subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire in this computerized 
experiment, which contained six problems of choice. The subjects were asked 
whether they were (hypothetically) willing to accept a single play of a gambling 
game. They were also asked whether they were willing to accept a series of 10 such 
games. After these two choices, the subjects were presented in the distributional 
format of the 10-time game and made decisions whether to accept it. Typical 
questions were of the form31, “Are you willing to accept the game …?”. The main 
purpose of such successive questions was to see whether the subjects that elected to 
accept the multiple-play game would change their minds when the explicit 
distribution of overall outcomes was provided. 
 
There were 164 subjects (68 advanced economics undergraduate students and 36 
other postgraduate students from the National University of Singapore and 60 
                                                        
31 The complete questionnaire is available at Appendix B. 
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engineering undergraduate students from Shanghai Jiaotong University) taking part 
in this computerized experiment. Both undergraduate students from the two 
universities were recruited within a classroom lecture, and postgraduate students 
who majored in different areas were recruited through an experimental emailing list. 
All the subjects in this study did not get any monetary incentives32. 
 
For each game type (M and V), there were three decisions to be made by all subjects 
(single, segregated mode, and aggregated mode). Questions in two different orders 
were presented to control for order effects. Therefore, within-subject information 
concerning the different presentation modes could be collected. 
 
3.2.2 Results of Study 2 
Table V: Acceptance Rate of Gambling Games 
Game M Game V 
Portfolio Acceptance Rate (%) Portfolio 
Acceptance Rate 
(%) 
Single 51.2 Single 38.4 
Segregated mode 26.2** Segregated mode 23.8* 
Aggregated mode 7.9** Aggregated mode 17.1* 
    **Significant at the 0.01 level. *Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
                                                        
32 Our participants were not given any economic incentive when responding to the hypothetical question, which 
would cause fear that they participants would not think carefully about question and would respond more or less 
at random. We must admit this shortcoming, however the effect is moderate still significant. 
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Two types of game, M and V, both with a high probability for trivial losses but with 
comparably small losses and small gains, were used. Comparing the acceptance rates 
between a 10-time game in a segregated presentation mode and the same in an 
aggregated presentation mode, we found that for both M and V, the rates became 
lower, thus supporting our hypotheses. The acceptance rates are summarized in Table 
Ⅴ. 
 
Nearly fifty-one percent of the subjects were willing to accept a single game M. Ten 
independent plays of M were accepted by 26.2% of the subjects when they were 
presented as a repeated trial (segregated presentation mode), and by only 7.9% of the 
subjects when they were displayed as aggregated distribution. The situation of game 
V is similar. Hence, a higher attractiveness of segregated evaluation can be noted for 
both games M and V. A paired-sample t  test shows the difference of the acceptance 
rates to be significant at the 5% level. This is well in line with our assumption about 
the coding of the repeated trial presentation. 
 
Let us explore more about type M and type V. We find that although both the 
acceptance rates for these two types of game are reduced if the overall distribution of 
the sequence is explicitly mentioned, M produces a more significant effect than V. At 
the same time, we find that many more subjects accepted a single play of M, which 
could be explained by the hope to win. This observation confirms the latter part of 
Hypothesis 5. A similar situation can be found in the case of the segregated mode, 
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but the acceptance rate is not as distinct as that in the single one. The subjects still 
wanted to win at a higher price, but rational individuals would think more about 
losing. In the case of the aggregated mode, the acceptance rate for M declined 
sharply. This might be due to the subjects paying special attention to the overall 
probabilities of losses and less to the outcome sizes(Lopes, 1996). Because 50% is 
especially salient, the pure loss probability for M is 66.5% and V is 48%. Thus, the 
former part of Hypothesis 5 is confirmed. 
 
If individuals have to evaluate a portfolio or a sequence of gambling games, their 
judgment is influenced by the portfolio presentation mode. A tendency for a narrow 
framing of the decision problem causes individuals to neglect the portfolio context if 
the overall outcome distribution is not explicitly mentioned. 
 
Table Ⅴ evidently supports Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4, and Hypothesis 5. For the 
type of gambling with a high probability for trivial losses, the highest acceptance 
rate was playing single time. The acceptance rate for a 10-time play in the segregated 
presentation mode was much lower than that for playing once. The number of 
subjects who would accept playing the game 10 times when given aggregated 
information was the lowest. Comparing the acceptance rates for 10 times playing M 
and V in aggregated presentation modes, we come to the conclusion that subjects pay 
special attention to the overall probability of losses. The higher acceptance rate for 
single M and 10 times playing M in segregated presentation mode can be explained 
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as the incentive of a big winning prize.  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been combined 
to provide a theoretical explanation for preference reversal in multiple gambling and 
single gambling. Manipulating the evaluation periods and presenting portfolios in 
different modes have been intended to find the impact of myopia. Our results show 
that the longer evaluation period cannot equal the aggregated mode. These two 
impacts have their own mechanisms which affect decision-makers when they are 
faced with multiple gambling with a high probability of trivial losses. 
 
Study 1 presents a direct experimental test of the impact of evaluation periods on 
loss aversion. In this design, through manipulating the evaluation period of certain 
subjects by giving them less information feedback and less freedom of adjustment 
than other subjects, a significant treatment effect is observed as in previous empirical 
tests (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Haigh & List, 2005; Thaler et al., 
1997). However, treatment effects among the Status quo Group and the Endowment 
Group are also noted here. The group effect in this study indicates that the degree of 
aversion to special types of gambling changes when subjects are in different 
situations. In our setting, the Status quo Group received money before they started 
making decisions. As they wanted to keep the money they had been given, they 
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showed more loss aversion. These observations support our theory prediction for this 
special type of gamble, that the evaluation period has their own particular 
mechanism to affect willingness. 
 
In Study 2, it is observed that judgment is influenced by the presentation mode. The 
results show that portfolios of mixed gambling with a higher segregated evaluation 
exist. A series of gambling with a high probability for rather small losses should 
appear less attractive to decision-makers if an aggregated evaluation is performed. 
This type of gambling can be largely found in slot machines. 
 
A few implications naturally follow. First, these findings have a positive sense on 
strategies for conducting public gambling activities. Slot machines are the easiest 
type of gambling capable of sustained growth in the long run (McGowan, 1994), 
thus governments prefer to introduce them as another source of revenue. This is what 
critics of the current explosion in gambling activities object to in their discussion. A 
short break on slot machines and prohibiting credits on gambling machines could 
induce gamblers to realize the losses and to adjust their activities (Traub, 1999). 
Moreover, presenting outcomes in the aggregated mode could be a useful method to 
help individuals recognize the harm of gambling machines. More of this will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Of course, this experiment is highly stylized, and real-world decision-makers could 
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not simply face risk, which is known probabilities of possible outcomes. These 
features are a cause for caution in extrapolating the results. They also suggest lines 
along which further experimental work may be pursued. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussion and Conclusion 
4.1 Practical Relevance 
4.1.1 Gambling as a Worldwide Phenomenon 
Rising incomes in advanced economies and rising demand for leisure have generated 
an increased demand for gambling products. Gambling now is worldwide industry, 
not only as leisure, but also as a fund-raiser for governments (Wangenheim, 2004). 
The decision has been made; Singapore will go ahead with her plans to build two 
Integrated Resorts, one on Marina Bay and the other on Sentosa. The casinos will 
induce more expenditure on gambling activities. However, relevant rules to manage 
gambling have to be established in order to pre-empt sociological problems, such as 
ascending crime by problem gamblers (Abt & McGurrin, 1992). 
 
Any visitor to a contemporary casino would be surprised if they found that there 
were no gambling machines available to play. As early as 200533, there were 1902 
slot machines in Singapore, and the government has accrued more than 200 million 
dollars of tax from them. With the construction of casinos, there will also be a 
parallel growth in the market for gambling machines. 
                                                        
33 The source could be obtained from the Internet: 
http://www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2005/05/xmrb050501f.html. 
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Slot machines and other electronic gambling machines are gambling devices that 
offer a variety of games. They are inexpensive to run, which makes it possible for 
casinos to offer low-stakes betting to a large number of customers. There is a general 
view that gambling machines are the most “addictive” form of gambling, in that they 
contribute more to the problems of gambling than any other gambling activity 
(Dowling, Smith, & Thomas, 2004). 
 
Problem gamblers may have a wide variety of erroneous beliefs about winning 
(Turner, 2000). Most of these errors are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the independence of random events. Many problem gamblers, for example, believe 
that, if an event has not come up recently, it is due to come up independently at 
random. Players underestimate the chances of repeated numbers, sequences, or other 
patterns occurring. Faced with an unusual event such as tossing up 10 heads in a row, 
many individuals will believe that the coin has a bias. Often these errors are due to a 
misunderstanding of the nature of long-term outcomes (Wagenaar, 1988). Varying 
the probability of different pictures on the slot machines means that they can have 
virtually any possible prize structure, including many small to medium prizes with 
rare huge jackpots (Dowling et al., 2004). Before a machine is licensed, its 
mathematical properties are tested across millions of simulated bets in order to prove 
(within a very small margin of error) to the casino operators that the machine will 
make money across players (McGowan, 1994). But the chance of any specific player 
winning in the long term never drops to zero. Some individuals need to be convinced 
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that they cannot win. For them if such research is conducted, it might lead to 
recommendations that could reduce the potential harm of these games. 
 
4.1.2 The Strategic Management of Gambling Machines 
The Singapore government has announced some rules34 that might be used to 
organize casinos in the future, one of which is replacing credit displays with cash 
displays and limiting cash size. This rule could be thought of as one of the methods 
to manipulate the evaluation periods for decisions on gambling machines. We hope 
the government will encourage other organizations to also provide aggregated results 
of playing gambling machines which will discourage more individuals from 
indulging in gambling machines. 
 
We should admit that our study has its limitations in practical relevance. However, 
our purpose is not to let problem gamblers quit their addiction. We try to prevent 
rational agents from getting addicted to gambling machines by providing them with 
information that they can obtain. The standard version of rational-choice explanation 
of behavior is set out in Figure 10. An action is rational if it satisfies three optimality 
conditions, represented by the unblocked arrows35. In this mechanism, available 
information is very important. The action has to be made by realizing the agent’s 
desires and beliefs, whose formation must not be distorted by mistakes in 
                                                        
34 Source from a local newspaper The Straits Times (Koh, 2005). 
35 A detailed explanation can be found at Elster (1999). 
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information processing or motivational biases (Elster, 1999). Thus, the amount of 
information gives the agent prior beliefs about the costs and benefits of information 





Figure 10: Rational Choice Mechanism 
Source from Elster (1986). 
 
Our findings attempt to suggest to the government to provide accurate information to 
gambling machines players. For most players, when they enter the casino, they have 
an unconscious wish to lose (Dickerson, 1993; Walters, 1994). However, some of 
them may lose self-control because those who stand to gain from gambling activities 
hinder self-monitoring cues. For instance, “it is impossible to see outside from inside 
a casino (the few windows and doors are often blacked out), so that it is impossible 
to tell whether it is day or night. There are no clocks on the wall” (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). Thus, an automatic short break on gambling machines or 
prohibiting credits on gambling machines could either increase their evaluation 
frequency or reduce the possibility of losing self-control. Our findings might be 
useful for guiding those individuals who occasionally gamble and do so moderately 
when they are triggered by a desire for entertainment and a hope for monetary gain. 
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The popularity of gambling behavior does not take place in a social vacuum. 
Individual activities are social products and individual decisions are directly and 
indirectly influenced by the social system (Abrams & Niaura, 1987). People’s 
attention is often drawn towards huge logos which present gambling machines as 
inexpensive price and large amount of wining prize, and towards the continuous 
rattling of money because of the grouping together of many slot machines (Wagenaar, 
1988). From our findings, providing the public with aggregated information of 
gambling machines may cause the popularity of gambling machines to go down 
more easily than up. However, once a high-consumption culture has become 
established, it may not be easily removed by political measures (Elster, 1999). 
 
Whether these rules would really help individuals to form a correct attitude towards 
gambling will take a quite a long time to prove. However, we hope further research 
in the experimental examination can make our society safe and harmonious. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
This thesis investigated the causal mechanisms underlying the effects of evaluation 
periods and presentation modes of multiple prospects on decision-makers’ 
willingness to accept the prospects. The key research question addressed by the 
current study is whether a longer evaluation period and an aggregated presentation 
mode always affect decision-makers’ willingness in the same way. To investigate this 
             
 65
question, we extended a theoretical discussion of Myopia Loss Aversion, in 
particular on the impact of myopia: evaluation periods and presentation modes. For 
special types of gambling with a high probability for trivial losses, a longer 
evaluation period cannot be equated to an aggregated presentation mode. 
 
In the theoretical part of this study, we extended the loss-aversion explanation with 
Loss Aversion and Mental Accounting (LA/MA) model (Barberis & Huang, 2001; 
Barberis et al., 2001). We formally analyzed the evaluation period of the various 
types of gambling. It turned out that although for both types of gambling, individuals 
would place more in betting, the mediational role of mental accounting was distinct 
and separate. Introducing lottery space (Langer & Weber, 2001) to analyze 
presentation modes, we found that portfolios of mixed prospects with a higher 
segregated evaluation exist. A portfolio of gambling with a high probability for 
rather low losses should appear more attractive to decision-makers if a segregated 
evaluation is performed. 
 
The different theoretical predictions were finally investigated in two experimental 
studies. Study 1 examined the difference caused by two treatments: frequent 
feedback and infrequent feedback. The average percentage allocated in betting with 
a longer evaluation period was significantly higher than with a shorter one, which 
might be caused by different degrees of loss aversion. Study 2 examined 
participants’ willingness to accept a multiple prospect consisting of a bundle of 10 
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plays of a single game with a high probability for trivial losses. The proportion of 
participants willing to accept this prospect was significantly lower when it was 
framed in an aggregated mode with the overall distribution of outcomes presented. A 
summary of all five hypotheses is presented in Table Ⅵ. 
 
Table VI: Summary of Hypotheses  
Hypothesis Outcome and Result Comparison with Other Studies  
Subject in Treatment I will 
bet more in betting game 
than Treatment F. 
The significant treatment effect 
was found both in Status quo 
Group and Endowment Group. 
The manipulation of evaluation 
periods made different attitude 
toward the same risky gamble.  
The treatment effect has been already 
observed in Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), Gneezy et al (2003) and Haigh 
and List (2005), but they all did not discuss 
such type of gambling we used in experiment, 
with a high probability for trivial losses. 
Treatment effect within 
Status quo Group will be 
more significant than 
among Endowment Group. 
The difference between Treat- 
ment F and Treatment I was 
more pronounced among Status 
quo Group. This might be 
caused by Status quo Bias, 
which made different degree of 
loss aversion among subjects. 
For those gambles with high probability for 
trivial loss, evaluation period affects attr- 
activeness though changing degree of loss 
aversion. However, evaluation period made 
risky option with positive expected return in 
previous works more attractive by cushioning 
subsequent losses by prior gains. 
The acceptance rate for 10 
repetitions of the gamble 
with high probability for 
trivial loss would be higher 
than single one. 
People always hope to win, 
although it is very hard to gain. 
Thus the single time trial was 
much higher than repeated 
playing. 
This procedure was replicated from Benartzi 
and Thaler (1999), but the measurement was 
not our focus.   
The acceptance rate for 10 
repetitions of the gamble 
with high probability for 
trivial loss in aggregated 
mode would be lower than 
segregated mode. 
Aggregated presentation mode 
made people pay more attent- 
ion to loss amount and loss pro- 
bability. Therefore, segregated 
presentation mode let such 
gambles more attractive. 
Although Langer and Weber (2001) assert that 
the higher attractiveness of aggregated preset- 
ation mode is not a general phenomenon. They 
only discussed the gamble with low pro- 
bability to high loss size. We extend their 
discussion to trivial loss gamble. 
Subjects overestimate the 
probability of losing money 
in repeated plays and 
overestimate the amount of 
gain in single trial. 
Two gambles with the same 
expected value, the one which 
are much more welcome for 
single playing was rejected by 
more subjects when explicitly 
mentioned outcomes of 10 
repetitions of the gamble. 
This confirmed the conjecture in Lopes (1996) 
that people have different criteria when 
evaluating single and repeated gamble. For 
trivial loss gamble, people pay attention to the 
amount of gain if they want to try playing 
once. However, they would care more about 
loss probability when repeated playing. 
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The current study has contributed to a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying evaluation periods and presentation modes, and of the effects of prospect 
framing on gambling machines, which have a high probability for trivial losses. This 
study has important implications for policy-making. Manipulating the evaluation 
period could increase the degree of loss aversion for gamblers playing slot machines, 
and presenting aggregated possible outcomes of gambling machines would eliminate 
belief-based departures from rational choice (Fox & See, 2003). The latter one is 
more important when individuals do not make their decisions to play gambling 
games. When individuals lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation occurs – 
they are at the mercy of the way information is presented. Subtle changes in the way 
risks are expressed can have a major impact on perceptions and decisions (Eadington, 
1999). 
 
Gambling activities cannot be seen only as investing behavior, such as buying stocks 
to win back money. Gamblers playing gambling machines may be subject to 
different motivations and, more generally, psychological processes (Elster, 1999). 
Thus, further experimental research is needed to be able to make reliable predictions 
of individual behavior in more complex real-world decision situations. 
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APPENDIX A 
Experimental Instructions for Study 136 
A.1 Introduction 
A.1.1 Introduction for the Status quo Group 
Welcome to our experimental study of gambling behaviour. The experiment will last 
for 40 minutes. The instructions for the experiment are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. Now the envelope on 
your desk has 45 CNY inside. This is not your final earnings from your participation. 
You might earn more or less than this amount based on your decisions in this 
experiment. 
 
The experiment will consist of two parts. The instructions for the second part will be 
distributed to you after the first part is completed. Before we start the experiment, 
however, you should fill in the Registration Form on your desk. This form will be 
used to register your decisions and earnings. One of you, however, will find the label 
“assistant” on the form. This person will assist me during the experiment, and will 
receive a payment that is equal to the average earnings of the other participants in the 
experiment. 
 
                                                        
36 Chinese translation of full instructions is available upon request. 
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In this experiment, 1 CNY exchanges for 20 cents. Thus, all of you have 900 cents in 
hand now. Part 1 of the experiment consists of 9 successive rounds, where you must 
decide in each round how much of this amount you wish to bet. One important thing 
is that in each round the maximum amount of bet you can place is 100 cents and the 
minimum amount is 0 cent. At the end of the experiment, at an exchange rate of  
100 cents = 5.00 CNY, you should get extra money if you win in the bet and you 
should hand in money if you lose in the bet. 
 
If you have questions, please raise your hand. 
 
A.1.2 Introduction for the Endowment Group 
Welcome to our experimental study of gambling behaviour. The experiment will last 
for 40 minutes. The instructions for the experiment are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. All the money you 
earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in cash, privately and immediately after 
the experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. The instructions for the second part will be 
distributed to you after the first part is completed. Before we start the experiment, 
however, you should fill in the Registration Form on your desk. This form will be 
used to register your decisions and earnings. One of you, however, will find the label 
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“assistant” on the form. This person will assist me during the experiment, and will 
receive a payment that is equal to the average earnings of the other participants in the 
experiment. 
 
Part 1 consists of 9 successive rounds. In each round, you will start with an amount 
of 100 cents. You must decide how much of this amount (between 0 cent and 100 
cents) you wish to place in the bet. At the end of the experiment, we will exchange 
the cents you have earned for money at an exchange rate of 1 cent equal to 0.05 
CNY. 
 
If you have questions, please raise your hand. 
 
A.2 Instructions for Part 1 
A.2.1 Instructions for Part 1 in Treatment F 
As mentioned in the introduction, you will play 9 successive rounds. In each round, 
you can only place a bet ranging from 0 cent to 100 cents. 
 
You have a chance of 1/13 to win ten times the amount you bet, and a 12/13 chance 
to lose the amount you bet. 
 
You are requested to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose you 
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decide to bet an amount of X cents (0≤X≤100) in this game. You must fill in the 
amount X in the column with the heading Amount in Gambling, in the row with the 
number of the present round. 
 
Whether you win or lose in the game partly depends on your personal winning card. 
This card is indicated on top of your individual sheet. Your winning card can be A to 
K, and is the same for all nine rounds. In any rounds, you win in the game if your 
winning card matches the round card that will be drawn by the assistant, and you 
lose if your winning card does not match the round card. 
 
The round card is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the 
gambling for the round, the assistant will, in a random manner, pick one card from a 
box containing 13 cards: A to K. The card drawn is the round card for that round. If 
the round card matches your winning card, you win; otherwise, you lose. Since there 
are 13 cards of which one will match your winning card, the chance of wining in the 
game is 1/13. 
 
Hence, your earnings in the game for the three rounds are determined as follows. If 
you have decided to put an amount of X cents (0≤X≤100) in the game, then your 
earnings in the game are equal to –X for each round card that does not match your 
winning card (you lose the amount bet for that round) and equal to +10X for each 
round card that matches your winning card (you win ten times the amount bet for 




The round card will be shown to you by the assistant. You are requested to record 
this card in the column Round Cards, under Win or Lose, depending on whether the 
round card does or does not match your winning card. You are also requested to 
record your earnings in the column Earnings from Gambling. Your total earnings for 
that round are equal to 100 cents (your starting amount) plus your earnings in the 
game. These earnings are recorded in the column Total earnings, in the row of the 
corresponding round. Each time we will come by to check your registration form for 
errors in calculation. 
 
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next round. Again you 
choose the amount (from 0 cent to 100 cents) you want to bet in the gambling. The 
same procedure as described above determines your earnings for this round. It is to 
be noted that your private winning card remains the same, but that for each round, a 
new card is drawn by the assistant. All subsequent rounds will also proceed in the 
same manner. At the end of the last round, your earnings in all the rounds will be 
summed up. This amount determines your total earnings for Part 1 of the experiment. 
After Part 1, the instructions for Part 2 of the experiment will be announced. 
 
             
 73
A.2.2 Instructions for Part 1 in Treatment I 
As mentioned in the introduction, you will play 9 successive rounds. In each round, 
you can only place a bet ranging from 0 cent to 100 cents. 
 
You have a chance of 1/13 to win ten times the amount you bet, and a 12/13 chance 
to lose the amount you bet. 
 
You are requested to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose you 
decide to bet an amount of X cents (0≤X≤100) in this game. You must fill in the 
amount X in the column with the heading Amount in Gambling. Please note that you 
fix your choice for the next three rounds. Thus, if you decide to bet an amount X in 
the game for round 1, then you must also bet an amount X in the game for rounds 2 
and 3. Therefore, the three consecutive rounds are bundled together on the 
Registration Form. 
 
Whether you win or lose in the game partly depends on your personal winning card. 
This card is indicated on top of your individual sheet. Your winning card can be A to 
K, and it is the same for all nine rounds. In any rounds, you win in the game if your 
winning card matches the round card that will be drawn by the assistant, and you 
lose if your winning card does not match the round card. 
 
The round card is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the 
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game for the next three rounds, the assistant will, in a random manner, for each of 
the next three rounds pick a card from a box containing 13 cards: A to K. For each of 
the three rounds, a card is drawn from a different box. The three cards drawn are the 
round cards for the present three rounds. If the round card matches your winning 
card, you win; otherwise, you lose. Since there are 13 cards of which one will match 
your winning card, the chance of wining in the gambling is 1/13. 
 
Hence, your earnings in the game for the three rounds are determined as follows. If 
you have decided to put an amount of X cents (0≤X≤100) in the game, then your 
earnings in the game are equal to –X for each round card that does not match your 
winning card (you lose the amount bet for the round) and equal to +10X for each 
round card that matches your winning card (you win ten times the amount bet for the 
round). 
 
The three round cards will be shown to you by the assistant. You need to record these 
cards in the column Round Cards, under Win or Lose, depending on whether the 
round card does or does not match your winning card. You are also requested to 
record your earnings in the column Earnings from Gambling. Your total earnings for 
the round are equal to 300 cents (your starting amount) plus your earnings in the 
game. These earnings are recorded in the column Total earnings, in the row of the 
corresponding rounds. Each time we will come by to check your registration form 
for errors in calculation. 
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After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next three rounds (4-6). 
Again you choose the amount (from 0 cent to 100 cents) you want to bet in the game. 
The same procedure as described above determines your earnings for these three 
rounds. It is noted that your private winning card remains the same, but that for each 
round, a new card is drawn by the assistant. All subsequent three rounds (7-9) will 
also proceed in the same manner. After the last round has been completed, your 
earnings in all the rounds will be summed up. This amount determines your total 
earnings for Part 1 of the experiment. After Part I,, the instructions for Part 2 of the 
experiment will be announced. 
 
A.3 Instructions for Part 2 
A.3.1 Instructions for Part 2 in Treatment F 
Part 2 of the experiment is almost identical to Part 1, but differs in two respects. First, 
Part 2 consists of three rounds (instead of nine rounds). Second, in Part 2 you play 
with the cents that you have earned in Part 1. To that purpose, we first divide your 
earnings in Part 1 into three amounts. The resulting amount is your starting amount S 
for each of the three rounds. Again you are asked how much of this amount (from 0 
to S) you wish to bet in the same game as Part 1. One important thing you should 
remember is that, in this Part, the maximum amount you can place is S and the 
minimum is 0. 
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The same procedure as described in Part 1 determines your earnings. You make three 
decisions in this Part. After that, your earnings in this part will be added. This 
amount determines your total earnings in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment. 
 
A.3.2 Instructions for Part 2 in Treatment I 
Part 2 of the experiment is almost identical to Part 1, but differs in two respects. First, 
Part 2 consists of three rounds (instead of nine rounds). Second, in Part 2 you play 
with the cents that you have earned in Part 1. To that purpose, we first divide your 
earnings in Part 1 into three amounts. The resulting amount is your starting amount S 
for each of the three rounds. Again you are asked how much of this amount (from 0 
to S) you wish to bet in the same game as Part 1. One important thing you should 
remember is that, in this Part, the maximum amount you can place is S and the 
minimum is 0. 
 
The same procedure as described in Part 1 determines your earnings. You make one 
decision in this Part. After that, your earnings in this part will be added. This amount 
determines your total earnings in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment. 
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APPENDIX B 
Questionnaire for Study 2 
The gambling game choice worksheet show several decisions. You are required to 
make a decision “yes” or “no”. Many thanks to you for participating in this 
questionnaire. 
 
1. Imagine that you have the opportunity to play a gambling game that offers a 4% 
chance to win 140 SGD37 and a 96% chance to lose 10 SGD. Would you play 
the game? 
 
2. Suppose you have the opportunity to play the above game 10 times, not just once. 
Would you play it 10 times? 
 
3. Imagine that you are offered an opportunity to play the following game. The 
probabilities and outcomes of the game are listed below: 
66.48% chance to lose 100SGD 
2.77% chance to win 50SGD 
0.12% chance to win 200SGD 
0.0048% chance to win 350SGD 
                                                        
37 For participants in China, the unit changes to CNY. 
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0.00002% chance to win 500SGD 
0.0000008% chance to win 650SGD 
Would you play this game? 
 
4.  Imagine that you have the opportunity to play a game that offers a 7% chance to 
win 80 SGD and a 93% to lose 10.32 SGD. Would you play the game? 
 
5. Suppose you have the opportunity to play the above game 10 times, not just once. 
Would you play it 10 times? 
 
6. Imagine that you are offered an opportunity to play the following game. The 
probabilities and outcomes of the game are given below: 
48.39% chance to lose 103,2SGD 
3.64% chance to lose 12.88SGD 
0.274% chance to win 77.44SGD 
0.021% chance to win 167,76GD 
0.002% chance to win 258.08SGD 
0.0001% chance to win 348.4SGD 
0.00008% chance to win 438.72SGD 
0.000006% chance to win 529.04SGD 
Would you play this game?
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